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The Canadian Cognitive Bias and its Influence on Canada/U.S. Relations  
 
 
Our unsolicited advice to Washington about the war on terror goes mostly 
unheeded, our small military contributions largely unappreciated. And far 
from our cherished self-image as the world's "helpful fixer," a sort of 
moral superpower, both Democrats and Republicans have come to view us 
as unhelpful nixers. Like the know-it-all neighbour who never misses a 
chance to bend your ear over the back fence or critique your yardwork, 
Canada has become the block bore…Things between our countries are 
apparently getting worse all the time. And, the evidence suggests, the 
attitude problem is almost entirely our own.1  
 
Canadians have a deep subconscious bias towards its neighbor to the south that 
manifests itself in fear, awe, arrogance and admiration. One would think that by now Canada 
would have outgrown this challenge. Canadians watch the same television. Their media 
bombards its viewers with many of the same advertisements as their American counterparts, and 
millions of Canadians travel to the United States each year. However, the Canadian population 
has a subconscious longevity that breeds the same reactions today as it did 120 years ago.  
Additionally, Canadians have a national characteristic best known as ‘clam-up.’ They 
manifest this trait when an event occurs that causes great sadness, fear, or embarrassment. When 
this happens, few people – if anyone – will talk about that issue, particularly those in the media, 
civil servants, or politicians. For example, one can see evidence of ‘clam-up’ in Canadian 
reactions to politicians who favor introducing government financial support for private schools, 
an unpopular issue in Canada since the 1890s. Security and intelligence initiatives that are 
historically nationally and regionally personal, such as World War I and responses to radical 
Islam, also cause “clam-up.” This trait is very subtle and can only be detected if one understands 
the unique history in which the roots of this trait rest. The population will obliterate any public 
official that does not read the signs behind the silence and embraces the ‘wrong’ policy at that 
moment. This bias and the secondary effects are at times pervasive and can work in opposition 
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to the policies and programs initiated by the nation’s security and intelligence community.  This 
study examines these themes from a historical perspective, studying how the past connects with 
the future. 
The purpose of this research is to explore the extent of such cognitive bias, and reflect on 
its contemporary significance to Canada-U.S. relations, particularly in the area of national 
security. The conclusion identifies issues that policymakers should further explore that may 
require strategies to mitigate possible future negative challenges. Today, the Canadian security 
and intelligence community has an excellent working arrangement with the U.S. and with its 
Commonwealth partners. Richard Aldrich affirms this assertion noting, “The most remarkable 
example of cooperation is the English-speaking effort in the realm of signals intelligence known 
as UKUSA. Sharing in this realm between the United States, the UK, Australia, and Canada is 
so complete that national product is often indistinguishable.”2   
However, this cooperation is periodically squeezed by the stress generated when defense 
and intelligence realities differ from Canadian perceptions of the United States. In 2013, Paul 
Koring, the Washington correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail newspaper, reported on 
a national poll conducted by Nanos Research and the University of Buffalo on the “Widening 
Gaps on Human Rights and National Security.”  Quoting Mr. Nanos, Koring wrote, “Across all 
the indicators, there is an increasing sense of drift in the Canada-U.S. relationship. It could be a 
result of a combination of factors including miscommunication and neglect on both sides of the 
border.” Unless remedial steps are taken, the relationship will continue to deteriorate, Mr. Nanos 
said. “If we see the drift continue, then Canada-U.S relations will become just a series of 
irritants between neighbours that should have very good relations,” Mr. Nanos added. He said 
he believed the drop reflected a range of American policies, from Mr. Obama’s preference for 
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missile-firing drones to kill suspects overseas, to U.S. spy agencies trolling of individuals’ data 
and threats to attack Syria over its use of chemical weapons. “We see an accumulation effect … 
on a number of fronts, including security surveillance and drones, but Syria is the signature 
event… It’s an issue that Barack Obama has 100 percent ownership of,” Mr. Nanos said before 
publicly releasing the survey’s findings.3 
When this cognitive bias activates Canadians on historically significant themes, the 
consequences can produce challenges for policymakers. A current example that parallels 
Canadian reactions to national security is healthcare, an area where Canadians believe their 
nation holds the high ground over Americans with respect to universal access and fairness. Nora 
Jacobson, an American who relocated to Canada in 2001, asserts in “Before You Flee to 
Canada, Can We Talk,” that Canadian anti-American bias can generate ‘policy blindness’ as 
“Canadians often point to their system of universal health care as the best example of what it 
means to be Canadian (because the United States does not provide it), but this means that any 
effort to adjust or reform that system (which is not perfect) precipitates a national identity crisis: 
To wit, instituting co-payments or private MRI clinics will make Canada too much like the 
United States.”4 Notice in this health care example two significant points; Canadians believe 
(without question) that their healthcare system is better than the U.S., and many refuse to 
discuss positive change to the system if an idea emulates the U.S. system.    
Students of history can view a similar trend with respect to national security. In 2011, 
confidential documents released by WikiLeaks revealed that Jim Judd, Director of the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) expressed dismay over Canadian attitudes about global 
terrorism, which could be described as willful bliss, similar to that in health care example.  
William Potter of the Toronto Star’s Washington Bureau wrote: 
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Canadians have an “Alice in Wonderland” attitude toward global terrorism, the 
former head of Canada’s spy service told a U.S. counterpart in 2008, according 
to a secret American memo disclosed Monday. Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service Director Jim Judd is also quoted as saying that Canadian courts have 
the security service “tied in knots,” hampering their ability to detect and 
prevent terror attacks inside Canada and beyond. Judd’s comments on 
Canadians and their courts echo private remarks made at CSIS headquarters in 
Ottawa, where security officials sometimes sarcastically refer to the legal 
obstacles as “judicial jihad.”5 
  
The ‘Alice in Wonderland attitude’ is code for the mindset explained by Jacobson. The 
varied court rulings referred to above on terrorist suspects reflect the more so called ‘tolerant’ 
tendencies that many Canadians embrace compared with their American cousins, and hence 
explain the frustrations voiced by CSIS in their fight against global terrorism when national 
security requirements conflict with certain Canadian belief systems. Fundamentally, Canada and 
the U.S. must work closely together to address international security threats (i.e. ISIS and 
Ebola), and both nations do not have the luxury to engage in differences driven by inherent 
biases that could weaken a badly needed North American resolve. 
 This paper will address one research question that focuses upon the extent of the 
bias and whose answer will direct analysts to the following hypothesis: History demonstrates 
that Canada-U.S. relations are influenced by a national cognitive bias against the U.S. that has 
created difficulties and pose future challenges for policymakers who must make choices for the 
betterment of North American national security. The research question is: Does Canada’s 
federal election of 1891 reflect the truism ‘with change comes the status quo’ concerning the 
attitude that many Canadians share toward the U.S., and is that bias sufficiently significant to 
warrant special attention by policymakers?   
This research focuses on Canadian attitudes toward the U.S. that affected both actions 
and decisions by policymakers. The first section will provide a literature review and an 
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overview of the methodology employed. Section two, ‘The Historical Perspective,” defines the 
philosophical differences between the founding of Canada and of America. This background 
places the election of 1891 as the centerpiece event that repeats itself for the next one hundred 
years. Section three, “With Change Comes the Status Quo” illustrates through examples how 
issues raised in the 1891 election resurface in Canada/U.S. relations through to the twenty-first 
century, while section four, “Reflections for the Twenty-First Century,” identify situations that 
mirror historical attitudes of 1891, this time with a focus on the future. The conclusion presents 
identifies issues that require attention by policymakers. The conclusion identifies issues that 
require attention from policymakers. 
Literature Review 
The study of Canadian bias toward the U.S. is a complicated subject with many 
historically-focused and current sources that present discussions on thematic areas such as 
economics, political science, and related policy implications between the two countries. Forty-
six sources support the analysis in this research paper; each one assessed through the lenses of 
three questions: what does the literature say, not say, and why it is important. The sources reveal 
four themes related to Canadian attitudes toward the U.S.: the origin of the Canadian bias, the 
conflict between two visions for Canada (continental emphasis vs. Europe), oscillation between 
perspectives (sometimes pro-American, sometimes against) but under a backdrop of suspicion 
of the U.S., and strong support for America when the nation faces grave difficulties. Canadian 
attitudes towards the U.S. have its origins in the philosophical differences stemming from the 
founding of the two countries.  Robert Ferguson, a communications expert for U.S. 
multinational corporations, outlines the differences on his website, “Canada: Peace, Order Good 
Government.”6 He notes that Canada is founded on the principles of “peace, order, and good 
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government” though the Constitution Act of 1867, while U.S. thinking is based on the 
declaration of independence from Great Britain where citizens are entitled to “life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness.”7 The former is structured on loyalty to the supremacy of the Crown, 
while the latter elevates “the right of the individual” as defined by principles.  
Ferguson’s explanation focuses on the ideas published in two prominent Canadian news 
journals at the beginning of the U.S. Civil War, the Montreal Gazette and the Toronto Globe as 
documented by Brian Gabrial in “The Second American Revolution: Expressions of Canadian 
Identity in News Coverage at the Outbreak of the United States Civil War.”8 Gabrial found that 
the editorials expressed antipathy toward the experiment of U.S. democracy based on individual 
rights, fear of American militarism, and possible U.S. invasion, patronizing sympathy for 
Americans, while at the same time, expressions of certain sympathies for the American South. 
Although Gabrial’s work is limited to the 1861 to 1865 period, the author provides the 
groundwork for scholars to understand Christopher Pennington’s research, The Destiny of 
Canada: Macdonald, Laurier and the Election of 1891.9  
Through both a biographical and historical approach, Pennington documents Canadian 
attitudes towards two conflicting national identify perspectives; a Canada connected to a 
continental vision with the U.S. and a nation focused towards the British Empire and eventually 
Europe.   The author explains in detail this ‘go-silent’ characteristic of the Canadian population 
(so evident today) through his descriptions of how political opponents avoided raising issues 
related to religion and education, two subjects connected to the great divide between English 
and French Canada. If both leaders engaged in conflict over these two ‘unspeakable areas’ the 
consequences could have led to disintegration of Canada.  Pennington’s research serves as an 
6




evidentiary starting point as it is the first election in Canada where the population voted on 
Canada’s future.   
As Canadian history moved through the twentieth century, one can see both intense 
periods of anti-U.S. sentiments and periods of close cooperation with the Americans. Simon 
Potter in The Imperial Significance of the Canadian-American Reciprocity Proposals of 1911, 
provides an in-depth account of Canadian and British reactions to the second attempt to realize a 
free-trade agreement with the U.S.10 The author illustrates the nature of the opposition to the 
agreement in the context of Canada’s ties and sympathies toward the British Empire and draws 
on parallels with Laurier’s first attempt to promote a trade agreement. A noted player in 
Canadian politics at that time was Sir Clifford Sifton, Canada’s Minister of the Interior until 
1905. Clifton was both anti-free trade and a strong proponent of a public education system (a 
significant Canadian preference until this day). D.J. Hall, in his book, Clifford Sifton: A Lonely 
Eminence 1901-1929, adds to Potter’s understanding of Sifton, and provides insights into why 
the Canadian bias against the U.S. subsided dramatically after World War I.11 A study of Sir 
Sifton reveals the extent of the dichotomy so evident in many Canadians today; at times 
Canadians oppose economic integration with the U.S. while at other times, the population 
supports a close relationship with the U.S. on foreign policy. At times the positions often 
reverse.  
As the world approached the Second World War, Canadians not only turned to the 
Americans for support, but the federal government, with the full encouragement of Great 
Britain, conducted a covert operation in the U.S. to encourage Americans to enter the war. 
William Stevenson in A Man Called Intrepid,12 explains the strategic thinking behind Canada’s 
and Britain’s position, while Phillip Hodgson adds to Stevenson’s research as he explains  in 
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Dispatches for Camp X,13 how Canadian and American senior public servants worked together 
on these activities. This cemented the relationship between the security and intelligence 
communities of both nations.  
After WWII, relations between Canada and the U.S. appeared stable as citizens of both 
countries experienced economic growth and were engaged in the Korean War. The situation 
changed substantially when the Canadian aerospace industry created the Avro Arrow, an 
advanced supersonic jet fighter program. The United States successively lobbied to kill the 
project in Canada, as American policymakers advised Ottawa that the U.S. government would 
not purchase the jet.  The “Arrow Digital Website,”14   run by former Avro employees, 
highlights why the Canadian bias began to return over this topic.  In Kennedy and Diefenbaker: 
The Feud that Toppled a Government,15  Knowlton Nash describes the intense dislike between 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Kennedy which culminated in fierce disagreements 
over another issue, namely Fidel Castro and the Cuban missile crises, during which the 
Canadian Prime Minster at first refused to cooperate with the Americans. Granastein and Hilmer 
in “Those Damn Yankees,” 16 provide readers with a short, but thorough synopsis of Canada-
U.S. relations during that period. Dennis Goresky and Johan Sigler in Public Opinion On United 
States-Canadian Relations,17 illustrate through surveys that Canada’s relationship with the U.S., 
while strained, did improve as a larger segment of the population expressed comfort with the 
Americans except on issues that related to Canadian culture, excessive American economic 
ownership, and certain aspects of foreign policy (Canadians generally supported Cuba). These 
two sources illustrate the Canadian dichotomy seen in history. 
 Goresky’s and Sigler’s attitudinal surveys into Canadian views are significant as they 
may explain the reason why in 1988 Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stepped into 
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the foray of Laurier’s 1891 election on free-trade – greater tolerance toward the U.S. in certain 
population segments. When one reviews Goresky’s paper, it appears logical to assume that the 
introduction of free-trade with the Americans would generate serious debate but not conflict. 
However, to the surprise of many Canadians and experts in foreign policy, several sources such 
as “Conservapedia”18 (an historical website) documented the outright hostility the trade proposal 
generated in close to half the population.   Lawrence Martin, in The Pledge of Allegiance: The 
Americanization of Canada, 19 corroborates Conservapedia’s views, however with a decided 
bias against the Prime Minister and the Americans. The surveys analyzed by Goresky did not 
pick up the ‘go quiet’ mood of Canadians, often described as the ‘clam up’ characteristic, which 
results in surprises for politicians and the media from the population. The literature supports the 
theme ‘With Change Comes the Status Quo” during the twentieth century, and the conflicting 
views of the population that Pennington found in his research on the election of 1891. 
Canada began the twenty-first century in a similar mindset to the post-WWI period, with 
a fading anti-American bias. However, Steve Maich, in Closer than You Think, 20 demonstrates 
that Canadians exhibit contradictions between the popular bias against the U.S. and similarities 
of thinking between Canadians and Americans. Patrick Cain’s story for Global News, “Six in 
ten Canadians more concerned about a terrorist attack on Canada,”21 corroborates Maich’s 
research. These sources confirm that this ‘contradicting view’ observed between the 1860s and 
1945 continues today, namely that U.S. foreign policy makes sense, but do not under any 
circumstance give Canadian sovereignty to the Americans. 
The literature review reveals that new challenges, such as issues surrounding water 
exports to the U.S., could complicate Canada/U.S. relations, thus ‘firing up’ the Canadian bias. 
In A Fight Reborn, Wilson-Smith reports that water exports became a major trade issue when 
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British Columbia passed legislation to ban bulk water exports to the U.S. 22 Since 1999, 
Canadians have been silent on water, but it is highly likely the population has only buried the 
issue.  This ‘silence’ characteristic can be seen in three news reports that described how two 
provincial elections were unexpectedly lost by the political party in the lead. This is critical 
because policies and programs, particularly in the highly vulnerable defense sector, could be 
delayed and/or cancelled due to unexpected public response.  
This study could not locate sources that documented ‘audit evidence’ examples of how 
surprising shifts in public opinion negatively affected security and intelligence in Canada as 
most of that information is restricted. The literature does reveal specific and significant 
incidents which are referred to in the subsequent sections. Therefore the focus of this paper is on 
bias through historical lenses that concludes with issues that could affect Canada’s security and 
intelligence community; areas policymakers should investigate to minimize the risks. 
Methodology and Definitions 
The study utilizes the historical method, where one synthesizes well-documented 
historical events and biographies of key participants. Authors John O’Brien, Dan Remenyi, and 
Aideen Keaney, in Historiography – A Neglected Research Method in Business and 
Management Studies, assert: 
Any real appreciation of the present requires an understanding of the past or the 
history of the situation. Those who know the history of the situation can more 
fully appreciate what is currently happening and the context in which it is 
happening. This implies a continuum in our existence and assumes not that in 
some respects the present or indeed the future looks something like the past but 
that the present or the future will be informed by the past. It is this ability of the 
past to inform the present and the future which makes historical studies 
interesting.23 
  
 The historical approach is applicable for this research as it combines a case study (the 
election of 1891) with a chronology of events that includes surveys about Canada/U.S. relations 
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conducted over selected periods of time. The paper is narrative which examines a fragment of 
the past (the election of 1891) to explain present circumstances. The outcome of this research is 
a set of issues that policymakers should explore in the event they must mitigate possible risks of 
rejection by Canadians on critical policies required to advance Canada/U.S. relations. Historical 
scholars who draw their findings from original documents and are reliable are the primary 
source. The events that trigger Canadian reactions to the U.S. are causation in nature (i.e. a 
statement in the U.S. media triggers a reaction from Canadians). David Hume, a Scottish 
philosopher defined cause as “an object, followed by another, and where all objects similar to 
the first are followed by objects similar to the second.”24 Hume’s definition connects the 
research questions, the hypothesis to the analysis.   
There are several definitions critical to this research. The “Oxford Dictionary On-Line” 
defines bias as a “cause to feel or show inclination or prejudice against someone or 
something.”25 “Business Dictionary On-Line” defines cognitive bias as the “common tendency 
to acquire and process information by filtering it through one’s own likes, dislikes, and 
experiences.”26 Group bias is directly related to group-think, which is “the practice of thinking 
or making decisions as a group, resulting in typically in unchallenged, poor-quality decision 
making.”27 
The Historical Perspective 
As indicated in the literature review, Canadian attitudes about the U.S. have their origins 
in the philosophical differences between the founding of Canada (peace, order, good 
government) and the U.S. (individual liberty). Ferguson’s explanation is consistent with 
Gabrial’s media reports on events during the U.S. Civil War.  The editorials expressed: 
antipathy toward the experiment of U.S. democracy based on individual rights, fear of American 
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militarism, concern over a possible U.S. invasion of Canada, and patronizing sympathy for both 
the American North and the South. As an example, Gabrial reported the following from 
Canada’s two prominent newspapers in 1861: 
As April 1861 came to an end, Brown [The Globe] wrote an editorial, headlined 
“Not Without its Drawbacks,” that expressed the general “British-Canadian 
suspicion of American democracy. The editorial, while supportive of Abraham 
Lincoln, remarked, “One of the results of the republican form of government is 
to develop to a greater extent than under any other system, the individuality of 
the people composing the nation.” The editorial continues, “Americans believe 
they can be president but the problem is they are taking actions and criticizing 
their leader without much regard.” To Brown, there was no “surer or shorter 
way to anarchy. Likewise, a May 3 Gazette editorial remark noted that it “is an 
absolute truth that the more you put power in the hands of the uneducated 
masses, the more you increase the influence of the demagogue, and lesson the 
conservative influence of wealth and intelligence.”28 
  
By the 1880s, Canadian feelings towards America included a moral tone that moved 
beyond simply recognizing their divergent views of democracy.  J.L. Granatstein and Norman 
Hillmer wrote in “Those Damn Yankees”: 
Canadians could effortlessly view their neighbours with a baleful gaze. They 
were rich and crass, but also immoral and violent. "We are free from many of 
the social cancers which are empoisoning the national life of our neighbours," 
wrote the Canadian Methodist Magazine in 1880. "We have no polygamous 
Mormondom; no Ku Klux terrorism . . . no cruel Indian massacres." Wilfrid 
Laurier, prime minister at the turn of the century, professed the greatest 
admiration for the United States, but he went on to note America's furious rate 
of murders and divorce, and thanked heaven "that we are living in a country 
where the young children of the land are taught Christian morals and Christian 
dogmas."29   
 
The belief systems of Canadians, instilled through British influences and combined with 
fear of the U.S., created attitudes that would spawn conflict when politicians and leaders 
presented alternative visions for Canada and U.S. relations. This made the 1891 election a 
pivotal historical event.   
12




Pennington, in The Destiny of Canada and the Election of 1891 proclaims, “The great 
issue at stake was nothing less than that future relationship between Canada and the United 
States, and by extension, the future of Canada itself.”30 Canadians, with their suspicions of the 
U.S. hardened during the tumultuous times of the 1860s, found themselves confronting 
Canada’s destiny through a great political debate; free-trade (referred to as reciprocity at the 
time) with the U.S. or continued preferential trade with Great Britain to maintain the Empire. 
During that election, two of Canada’s greatest prime ministers engaged in a ferocious election 
campaign. Sir John A. MacDonald, then prime minister, leader of the Conservative Party (also 
referred to as the Tories), and a Protestant by religion sought re-election. He was the leading 
figure behind the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867. In 1885, MacDonald officiated 
the opening of Canada’s first coast-to-coast transcontinental railway, the Canadian Pacific. To 
protect the nation from absorption into the U.S. through economic integration, his government 
erected very high tariffs on American imports. MacDonald’s vision was to maintain Canada as 
part of the British Empire. Pennington quotes MacDonald’s passionate letter to the media: 
As for myself, my course is clear. A British Subject I was born - A British 
subject I will die. With my utmost effort, with my latest breath, will I oppose 
the “veiled treason” which attempts by sordid means and mercenary proffers 
to lure our people from their allegiance. During my long public service of 
nearly half a century, I have been true to my country and its best interests.”31   
 
The Tories harnessed the press to proclaim their position. Pennington writes that almost 
all major Canadian newspapers supported the Conservative position. MacDonald set the election 
tone for three quarters of the campaign when he declared that voters had one of two choices, 
“loyalty or treason.” Pennington reports that the Boston Republic newspaper handed the Tories 
and Canadian media “evidence of true American motives” on a silver platter, when it suggested, 
“it was high time for the Canadian people to stop worshipping Queen Victoria, an obese, beer 
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guzzling German woman who has no more claim on them than has the Ameer of 
Afghanistan.”32 
Such quotes from the U.S. media generated national anger. Pennington reports that in 
Halifax there was a festive rally of over 4,000 citizens with banners reading “God Save the 
Queen.” The U.S. media solidified MacDonald’s position and inadvertently elected the Tories in 
Canada. This also demonstrated the power and influence the U.S. media could have on 
Canadians. 
MacDonald’s counterpart was Sir Wilfred Laurier, leader of the national Liberal Party, 
and a Roman Catholic, born in Quebec. Laurier’s vision for Canada was a nation that protected 
individual freedom and liberty, and hence was very American in tone. He believed in separation 
of church and state, which placed him at odds with the Roman Catholic Church. Pennington 
writes, “The powerful Roman Catholic Church traditionally supported them [the Conservatives] 
– parish priests were known to warn their flocks that Tory bleu was the colour of heaven and 
Liberal rouge the colour of hell and the Conservatives carried the vast majority of the province’s 
sixty five seats.”33 The Church played a significant role in the defeat of Laurier as many priests 
proclaimed him a supporter of the Protestant, prejudiced nation to the south that hated Catholics.  
Laurier was not afraid of Americans. He believed in both personal and economic liberty, 
to the extent that he campaigned for a customs union with the U.S. where both countries would 
be tariff free. He initiated a strong counterattack against MacDonald’s loyalty thrust. Pennington 
reports that the Liberals reminded voters that MacDonald’s high tariff on policy on U.S. led to 
high prices and unemployment, facts that no one could deny. Laurier further proclaimed: 
In his manifesto, Sir John as usual, appeals to the loyalty of his British 
subjects, against the prejudices of the Liberal Party. He says we are disloyal 
because we want reciprocity. Then he himself has been guilty of that crime, 
for formerly he advocated such a policy and recently, when he found that the 
14




country was clamouring after free-trade, he again committed the same crime 
by stealing from us part of the program. No gentlemen, as of yor we are still 
true and loyal to our Sovereign Lady the Queen.34  
 
Laurier changed the direction of the campaign to reflect only the reciprocity argument as 
there were two silent “gorillas in the room” that both party leaders were cognizant of and 
desperate to avoid at all costs. The first was a deep simmering clash of English verses French 
that could tear the nation apart. The second was the famous ‘Manitoba School Question.’ When 
MacDonald’s government created the Province of Manitoba in 1870, the law required that 
province to provide services to both French and English populations. In the 1880’s Manitoba 
ceased funding Catholic schools in favor of the public school system, a policy direction that 
created a national furor in French and Catholic communities. All politicians went silent on the 
two matters throughout the campaign, as did the Canadian population. This event is the first 
recorded example of the ‘clam-up.’ In 1891, MacDonald’s Tories won the election focusing on 
Canada/U.S. trade issues with 118 seats while Laurier attained 90 seats. 
 
With Change Comes the Status Quo 
 
The Canadian cognitive bias illustrated in the election of 1891 did not change 
significantly during the first eleven years of the twentieth century.  The First World War arrived 
and affected Canada deeply, leaving scars that would impact the nation for a hundred years. 
Relations with the United States continued to improve in the 1940s as both shared common 
enemies during the Second World War, which resulted in a thaw in the Canadian bias. However, 
attitudes froze for ten years, from 1956 through to the late 1960s and then in the late 1980s 
fierce debates ensued when free-trade hit the agenda one more time. In 1911 and 1988, 
Canadians repeated the reactions that voters held during the election of 1891.  
15
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MacDonald’s Tories reigned for five years after 1891, and were then defeated over the 
Manitoba School Question. The Conservatives, believers in a strong national central 
government, promised legislation to overturn the Manitoba government’s decision not to fund 
Catholic schools. Laurier, then leader of the Opposition, strongly opposed this centralization of 
power on the grounds such a policy intervened with provincial rights, a popular view held by 
citizens of Manitoba, and the central Canadian populations of Ontario and Quebec. Laurier 
advanced a solution that met the expectations of the conflicting interests; publicly funded 
Catholic schools where the population warranted funding, and defense for a public school 
system. As a result, Laurier won the election of 1896.  During the next fourteen years of Liberal 
reign, Canada advanced technologically, with new lands opened for immigration.  
Sir Clifford Sifton, Laurier’s Federal Minister of the Interior, travelled worldwide selling 
Canada to prospective immigrants as the ‘fields of dreams.’ Canada’s population grew by more 
than three million people between 1896 and 1914, reducing Clifton’s fear of an American 
annexation of western Canada. However, unresolved conflict lurked behind Laurier’s 
advancements. In 1905, Sifton resigned from the Liberal Cabinet, over disagreements with 
Laurier on national education. The Interior Minister strongly supported a national public 
education system, as opposed to adopting the American private/public system. Laurier was 
determined to leave education matters to the provinces.35   
In 1911, the Canada/U.S. trade issue, with widespread national concerns over American 
intentions, reared its head again.  Laurier was defeated in 1911 when he tried again to introduce 
a Canada-U.S. trade agreement. The general election of that year was fiercely fought, largely on 
the free-trade issue, and Laurier's second attempt at reciprocity with the U.S. generated populist 
fear that free-trade was the first step to political annexation. In his research on Canada and its 
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relations with the U.S. under British Imperial influences, Simon Potter confirms that 
“substantial sections of the Conservative press greeted the reciprocity proposals with howls of 
protest, accusing the government of seeking economic and ultimately political union with the 
United States thereby betraying Canada’s imperial heritage.”36 To make matters worse for 
Laurier, the New York Times, according to Baker in A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in 
English Canada, reported that Champ Clark, a prominent Democrat and Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, claimed that free-trade was indeed the first step toward annexation with the 
U.S.  
Ottawa Ont. Feb 15 – There was considerable interest and some irritation here 
today over Champ Clark’s speech in the House at Washington yesterday in which 
he said that the reciprocity agreement was the first step toward annexation. At the 
opening of today’s session of the House (of Commons), Col. Sam Hughes read a 
newspaper abstract of the speech and asked if it were a fair statement of 
intention.”37  
 
Just like when the Boston newspaper editorial proclaimed the irrelevance of Queen 
Victoria to Canada during Laurier’s 1891 election, the U.S. media once again lit a fire of bias 
toward the U.S. when the Times published its article. In the midst of this fire storm, Champ 
further stated “I am for it [reciprocity] because I hope to see the day when the American flag 
will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions, clear to the North 
Pole.”38 Voters did not buy into Laurier’s assertion that the trade negotiated with the Americans 
was purely business, and in 1911 the Conservatives defeated the Liberal government. While 
many Canadian historians assert there were other reasons for  Laurier’s defeat, such as a tired 
government, the 1911 election illustrated ‘the more things changed, the more they stayed the 
same’ when it came to the attitudes of many toward the U.S.  
The anti-American bias evident in both the elections of 1891 and 1911 went largely dormant 
for the years leading up to the First World War till the end of the Second World War. Canada’s 
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experience defending the Empire proved costly and the political and popular opinion supported 
moves to distance, but yet remain associated with Great Britain.  Canada, with a population of 
7,879,000 people, contributed almost eight percent of its citizenry to the World War One effort 
in defense of the Empire.39 Historians for Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) summarize the 
carnage: “For a nation of eight million people Canada's war effort was remarkable. A total of 
619,636 men and women served in the Canadian forces in the First World War, and of these 
66,655 gave their lives and another 172,950 were wounded. Nearly one of every ten Canadians 
who fought in the war did not return.”40 VAC further records that through this war, Canada 
reached nationhood and earned the right for a separate signature on the Treaty of Versailles, 
given the gallantry demonstrated by the Canadian at the battles of Ypres, the Regina trench, the 
capture of Vimy Ridge, Passchendaele, and finally their entrance to Mons on November 1918.  
After the war, Canadian views of its role in the Empire began to shift as many prominent 
politicians and a substantial segment of the population believed that ‘colonials’ served only as 
‘cannon fodder’ for the defense of Great Britain in European wars. In 1925, Sir Clifford Sifton, 
the anti-free-trade adherent in the 1911 reciprocity debate, astonishingly asserted that Canada 
must agree and support the U.S. with respect to its involvement in the ‘The League of Nations.’ 
Hall in his writings on Sifton states: 
Sir Clifford was no less vehement in denouncing the League of Nations and the 
international aggression committed by several of its leading members, including 
Greece, France, and Britain. The League was ‘a preposterous and expensive farce 
and amounts to nothing more than a part of a machine designed to involve us in 
European and Imperialistic complications’…Canada ought to follow the American 
lead, partly because they accurately perceived the risks of League membership and 
partly because Canada’s proper foreign policy ought to be ‘to avoid any trouble 
with the United States, and we have no business in the League when the United 
States is staying out. ‘Without the Americans, the League would be nothing more 
than an Agency for European countries to use in settling up their disputes, which we 
have absolutely nothing to do with.41  
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Sifton’s view of Canadian foreign policy reflected the feelings of many Canadians after 
the carnage of the First World War and was a distinct change in attitude toward the U.S., 
representing a new dimension in the national bias toward America. While Sifton argued 
extensively that Canada should follow the U.S., he also asserted that reciprocity would be the 
first step away from our heritage and voiced opposition to such an arrangement.  Despite this 
emerging attitude in favor of U.S. isolationist foreign policy, Canada and other members of the 
Empire immediately declared war on Hitler subsequent to Britain’s declaration. 
Britain, desperate to have the U.S. engaged in the Second World War, asked Canada to 
work closely with the U.K. government to lobby the Americans to support the Empire war 
effort. Essentially, the Canadian anti-American bias became the pro-American bias to save 
Great Britain. The British and Canadian government chose William Stephenson to both organize 
and carry out this mission. Stephenson’s closest friends were Bill Donavan (founder of the 
United States Office of Strategic Services) and Winston Churchill. Stephenson warned the 
Canadian prime minister that, without the U.S. in this war, the remaining free countries must 
feed resources to the Soviet Union, and Joseph Stalin could eventually emerge as the new world 
superpower, a dreadful possibility. British Prime Minister Churchill and the Canadian leadership 
knew they had to take “active steps” to convince the U.S. to join the Allies with the full force of 
American resources. Churchill created the Special Operations Executive (SOE), an international 
intelligence group for deception, disinformation, and sabotage activities against the Nazis.42 The 
Prime Minister gave instructions to Stephenson to establish an organization in the U.S. to 
conduct covert operations to realize three objectives: bring the U.S. into the war, drive the Nazis 
out of South America, and establish a training facility in Canada to train SOE agents and 
Americans called Camp X.43 The facility opened in 1941, but unofficially it was operational 
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earlier with the  participation of Bill Donavon. Stephenson built the facility near Oshawa, a 
community fifty miles east of Toronto; close to the U.S. but far enough from the border to be 
unnoticed. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canada’s new national radio company, 
purchased from U.S. radio interests large antennae that actually served as signal intelligence to 
intercept both German and Japanese traffic (known as Project Hydra). It formed part of 
Bletchley Park’s infrastructure. Hodgson, in Inside Camp X, summarizes the role of Hydra: 
“Paramount among the objectives set out for the operation, including the training of Allied 
agents for the entire catalogue of espionage activities (sabotage, subversion, deception, 
intelligence, and other special means), was the necessity to establish a major communications 
link between North and South America and European operations of SOE. Code-named Hydra, it 
was the most powerful of its type.”44  
Stephenson indicated that Camp X trained approximately 2,000 people in the fine arts of 
deception and sabotage. Before the U.S. established Camp David, Camp X trained fifty-six 
Americans that included FBI and OSS operatives. The “OSS Camp X Historical Website” 
confirms: “Over the next ten months several hundred more OSS agents would travel to Canada 
where they would receive both basic and specialized training courses at Camp X…to form the 
backbone of the OSS/CIA wielding considerable influence over its wartime development and 
post war direction.”45  
As part of the espionage plan toward the U.S., Stephenson trained a selection of 
beautiful women he hired in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal who specialized in ‘personal 
services.’ The SOE arranged work for them in Washington and London, where they functioned 
as ‘secretaries’ and eventually private escorts. According to Stevenson, their objective was to 
acquire information on wealthy Nazi supporters and blackmail key politicians to ensure they 
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voted in favor of Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease and other key pieces of American legislation. 
Hodgson records that in October 1941, Stephenson provided to Roosevelt a fake map, 
supposedly stolen from German intelligence, which showed South America partitioned for Nazi 
control. The President, unaware of its lack of authenticity, revealed the document to the media. 
Stephenson arranged for his staff to work as “clerks” in Gallup polls, an innovation at that time 
for research into public attitudes. Hodgson reports Stephenson’s team distorted American 
polling statistics to demonstrate voter support for the war effort against Germany. The 
Canadians coordinated a comprehensive disinformation campaign throughout South America 
that included Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, and Ecuador. They were effective. 
Congress approved Roosevelt’s requests to supply Britain with materiel before they entered the 
war in 1941.  Canada organized on behalf of the Empire (soon the Commonwealth) covert 
activities in the U.S. to bring America fully into the twentieth century as a world superpower to 
combat Hitler and later the Soviet Union. The Canadian anti-American bias withered, albeit to 
save the British Empire. 
Canadian biases toward the U.S. remained dormant for ten years subsequent to the end of 
the Second World War, largely due to involvement in the Korean War and the substantial 
economic growth in both countries. ‘It’s Back’ began in 1956, when Canada developed one of 
the most advanced jet fighter in the world, referred to as the Avro Arrow. According to former 
Avro scientists, the U.S. made it clear to Canada, through John Foster Dulles, that only the U.S. 
had the right to own such technology and that Canada should play a supporting role in U.S. 
defense technology developments. The former scientists reported: “It is now AIR TIGHT that 
they canned the Arrow due to the machinations of John Foster Dulles, Ike and others in JULY 
1958!!.”46 Canadian aeronautics experts were unaware of U.S. developments on the U2 spy 
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plane and its successor the SR71 Blackbird, and American leaders did not want the USSR to 
have competing technology extracted by espionage from Canadian developments. Prime 
Minister John Diefenbaker, yielded to U.S. pressure and cancelled the Arrow project and, 
supposedly at the insistence of the U.S., destroyed all the plans. He resented this decision for 
years and retaliated against the U.S. through Canadian support for Cuba and the Chinese 
Communist government on matters of trade.   
  In 1960-1961, Canadian-U.S. relations deteriorated significantly. The Kennedy 
Administration told Canada that it had to place U.S. nuclear missiles on Canadian soil and 
Diefenbaker refused. Martin, in his book concerning the Americanization of Canada notes: 
    Diefenbaker promoted Canadian independence with evangelical zeal... 'We are a 
power, not a puppet,' the Chief thundered during the controversy over the placement 
of U.S. nuclear warheads in Canada. 'His rampant nationalism alienated the entire 
ruling class: Bay Street, Wall Street, his civil service and politicians from all 
parties.  [George] Grant credited the Chief with the strongest stance against satellite 
status ever attempted by a Canadian.  This stance came at a high price.47 
 
  The following year, during the Cuban Missile Crises, the Conservatives first refused to 
cooperate with the U.S. in the blockade. The Conservative Foreign Minister pleaded the cabinet 
to reconsider “blindly following the U.S. lead, particularly since the President had not kept the 
commitment to consult Canada over the impending [missile] crisis. If we go along with the U.S. 
now, we’ll be their vassal forever.”48 Canada had recognized Cuba as an independent state. 
President Kennedy demanded that Canada stop trading with Cuba, so the Prime Minister 
doubled the trade volumes instead. Prime Minister Diefenbaker then went even further. When 
China’s agricultural policies failed, resulting in near starvation for close to 30 million people, 
Canada executed the largest wheat sale ever to China. Newman reported that Kennedy advised 
the Prime Minister that he would blockade Canadian ships, an action that did not occur.   
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 Nash reported that Kennedy remained furious over Canada’s support for Cuba and when 
the Conservatives called their election one year later, the CIA ran a disinformation campaign 
against Diefenbaker from inside the doors of the U.S. Embassy. Canada’s support for Cuba 
solidified when the public became aware of American interference. Many policymakers and the 
public ignored the real threat of Soviet interference and supported Cuba because it was the best 
way to antagonize Kennedy and the U.S. in general. The Kennedy Administration’s move to 
assist the Liberals in the defeat of the Conservatives ultimately backfired. Canadians voted in 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau, a left-leaning prime minister that was even more anti-American. 
 Trudeau’s policies built on Diefenbaker’s legacy. The Tory Prime Minister refused to 
join the U.S. in nuclear war training exercises (1959), he was the first white leader to seek 
banning South Africa from the Commonwealth (1961), he was the first prime minister to end 
discrimination against Asians and black immigrants (1960), he supported a total nuclear test ban 
against the wishes of the U.S. (1962), he was in opposition to joining the Organization of 
American States (1961), and he appointed women to his cabinet. Not only did Trudeau embrace 
Diefenbaker’s views, he became personal friends with Fidel Castro, in defiance against the U.S 
who sought a total ban on any cooperation with Cuba.  
 Trudeau’s action could have proved costly. In January 2008, Canadian news reported 
that the Kennedy and Nixon administrations authorized the CIA to assassinate Castro, and 
possibly Trudeau, with support from Mafia Chieftain Myron Lansky. According to Robert 
Wright: 
Sensational stories about a dual-murder conspiracy against former Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau and Cuban President Fidel Castro have recently surfaced. The only 
Canadians not surprised by such reports appear to be the men and women who 
served as Trudeau's RCMP security detail…The idea that anti-Castro plotters 
might have wanted Trudeau and Castro dead is entirely plausible. The two were 
friends and "intellectual soulmates," as a Canadian ambassador to Cuba once put 
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it. Castro even served as an honourary pallbearer at Trudeau's state funeral in 
October 2000. Both were educated by Jesuits and trained in the law. Both were 
men of formidable intellect whose political idealism inspired millions of their 
compatriots, infuriated millions of others, and changed the course of their nations' 
histories.49 
 
The Canadian anti-American bias accelerated considerably with the revelation that the 
CIA conducted covert medical experiments by force on Canadian citizens throughout the 1960s 
and possibly into the 1970s, at the prestigious Allen Institute located in Montreal.  Doctor 
Cameron conducted covert LSD experiments relating to mind control. When a patient arrived 
for his or her for treatment, he used the legal medical powers of the Province of Quebec at the 
time to force patients into taking treatments. If they refused, he, through the law, would have 
them confined.  One patient was the wife of a Canadian Member of Parliament. The MP was left 
of center, a standard British Labor Party derivative, not a Communist. According to the New 
York Times, David Orlikow, a retired member of Parliament, whose now-deceased wife, Velma, 
was another subject, said she emerged from the treatment “really a disabled person, not 
physically but emotionally.”50  
   The Times further reported that “the patients were put into a drugged sleep for weeks or 
months, subjected to electroshock therapy until they were ‘de-patterned,’ knowing neither who 
or where they were, and forced to listen to recorded messages broadcast from speakers on the 
wall or under their pillows.”51 It is worthy to note, that while Canadians placed the blame on the 
U.S. government, many ignored the possibility of Ottawa’s knowledge or participation.   
 Goreksy and Sigler, in their analysis of political polls conducted between 1960 and 1973 
report that in 1963, 31 percent of Canadians believed that the state of relations with the U.S was 
improving, increasing to 38 percent by 1970. Conversely, during the same period, the 
percentage who believed relations worsened increased substantially from 5 percent to 26 
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percent. The authors found that a majority of Canadians supported some form of government 
regulation over U.S. foreign ownership, embraced a complex mixture of national consciousness 
combined with regional economic concerns, and expressed an increasing resentment of U.S. 
economic and cultural intrusions. However, their study did not identify ‘rampant ’anti-American 
attitudes.52 Nonetheless, reactions to the abovementioned events, including the Cameron 
experiments, do reveal a rise in anti-American bias. Moderate increases in positive attitudes 
towards the U.S. posted from these survey results (+38 percent) most likely compelled the post-
Trudeau government to approach free-trade even though the anti-U.S. bias increased as well.   
 What happened to the ‘no evidence of rampant anti-American attitudes’ found in the above 
noted surveys? In 1988, the ‘spirit of 1891,’ confirmed by the election of 1911, and hardened 
somewhat during the 1960s and 1970s, returned with a vengeance. Conservative Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney, who defeated the Liberals in 1984, adopted Laurier’s reciprocity policy and 
completed negotiations with the Americans for comprehensive Canada/U.S. free-trade. The 
Liberals, who borrowed the historical Tory position, vowed to destroy that “sellout” in the 
Senate. When the writ was dropped for the election, “Canada proceeded to have one of its most 
lively federal elections in history, with the main election issue focused on the Free-trade 
Agreement itself.”53 The Conservatives won and the government approved the deal. However, 
within five years, the Conservatives had gone from the greatest majority victory in Canadian 
history to the worst electoral defeat in Canadian history. In 1993, the Liberals won a majority 
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Reflections for the Twenty-First Century 
 
 
The debate over the Mulroney-led Canada-U.S. Free-trade Agreement (FTA) became a 
furious and hostile event, equivalent to the conflicts during the Laurier-MacDonald election of 
1891. Eventually, after the two countries signed the deal, the Canadian negative attitude fizzled, 
and both Canada and the US solidified the trade relationship. The agreement included 
definitions for subsidies that excluded government expenditures on defense, regional 
development policies and programs, Canadian Medicare, and cultural industries. Additionally, it 
contained a dispute resolution settlement where either country could file a trade complaint (i.e. 
Canadian lumber and American fishing claims). In the 1990s Canada and the U.S. expanded the 
original FTA to include Mexico, and the three parties renamed it as the ‘North American Free-
trade Agreement’ (NAFTA).  
The twenty-first century opened with the realization that terrorism is an international 
threat to national security. By 2004, Canadians had reflected on the events of September 11, 
2001, and accept the real possibility that terrorist attacks could strike the homeland. Prior to this, 
in 1999, a fundamental shift occurred, with 71 percent of Canadians having a positive opinion of 
the U.S.  By 2004 this number had declined substantially once again.  Steve Maich summarizes 
results from surveys taken during that period: “In 1999, an Environics poll found 71 percent of 
Canadians held a favourable view of the United States. In 2003, a survey for the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project found that had fallen to 63 percent. And this year, the number was down to 59 
percent. In late 2004, a poll by COMPAS for Global Television found 48 percent of respondents 
felt more "anti-American" lately, compared to just 23 percent who felt more "pro-American.”54  
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 However, Maich also found that U.S. and Canadian public opinion surveys yielded 
surprisingly consistent opinions in both countries on closer cooperation between the two 
countries on national security (65 percent Canada, 73 percent U.S.), border security (75 percent 
Canada, 81 percent U.S.), anti-terrorism (74 percent Canada, 81 percent U.S.), and coordinated 
energy policies (85 percent Canada, 89 percent U.S.). Seven years later, public opinion pollsters 
confirmed that Canadians retained their pro-defense cooperation views with the U.S. In 
covering a poll conducted in 2011 for Global News, Patrick Kane, a journalist for Global 
Edmonton reports: “One of the strongest majorities in the poll backed the North American 
security perimeter, with 70 percent agreeing that Canada harmonizing its security and border 
policies was ‘necessary and prudent’. Eighty-one percent of Albertans agreed, while agreement 
in Quebec was slightly higher than the national average, at 73 percent. Older Canadians and 
women were more likely to agree, and British Columbians less likely, at 60 percent.”55 
 The above result is a remarkable reversal of Canadian bias, particularly in Quebec, Canada’s 
most left-leaning province. If anyone proposed a North American security zone prior to the 
events of September 11th, 2001, that political party would most likely have lost the election. 
With respect to women attitudes verses those of men, Cain reports, “Women, interestingly, gave 
more hawkish responses than men throughout the poll, generally being more in favour of 
vigilance, the use of force overseas and co-operation with the U.S.” For the last forty-five years, 
Canadian women were far more anti-American than men and they tended to hold stronger views 
leaning to the left falling victim to the traditional Canadian bias.  
Additionally, twenty-six years ago a substantial segment of the Canadian population 
strongly opposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), originally envisioned by President 
Ronald Reagan. The U.S. gave birth to SDI in the center stage of Canada’s controversy over 
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free-trade. Both issues became psychologically entangled with myths and latent fears generated 
by that debate. Every prime minister since 1984 opposed Canada’s involvement in this defense 
initiative except for Prime Minister Jean Chretien, who adopted a more moderate position. In 
2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin publically signaled to the U.S. that Canada was ready to 
discuss many irritants between the two nations. Lee Carter of the BBC news summed up the 
President’s visit to Canada as “Bush patches up Canada’s relations,” noting “Mr. Bush made a 
brief mention of talks on Canada's further co-operation in America's controversial missile 
defense programme, but the full details of those talks are not known. Public opinion is deeply 
opposed to Canadian involvement, but Canada is also a key player in Norad, a common North 
American defense alliance.”56  
The current Conservative Government, with support from a majority of Canadians, has 
moved beyond historical fears, and in 2011, the Harper Conservative Government successfully 
negotiated a comprehensive, continental-wide agreement covering trade and security with the 
U.S. referred to as “Beyond the Border,” an impossible occurrence twenty-five years ago. 
Today there is a prominent national issue that meets the conditions for a Canadian 
cognitive bias reaction rooted in subconscious longevity that at some point may manifest itself 
in silence and explode either in open controversy or through negative voter reactions. 
Symbolically, water is Canada’s “Area 51.” There are organizations that try to mobilize 
Canadian subconscious biases through provision of facts (most out of context), and ‘evidence’ 
from supposed ‘witnesses’ that link water to broad-based conspiracy theories traced to the 
Mulroney’s trade deal. Apparently an advisor to the original trade negotiations found documents 
that contained plans for a ‘grand canal’ that would move water to the U.S. from Canada’s north. 
Chief of Quebec Cree, Matthew Coon-Come, who is head of the “Canadian Institute of Political 
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Integrity,” reports on his website “The biggest scam ever to be pulled on the entire world is 
Free-trade and I'll tell you why. Simon Reisman (Canada’s trade negotiator) had a difficult job. 
He was the director of a project called the Grand Canal, which is to be built from James Bay.”57 
 This source feels similar to MacDonald’s fear tactics over free-trade in 1891. The 
authors’ of the above quote are well aware of Canada’s inherent biases and seek to feed it with a 
conspiracy view. However, on water diversion, it is highly probable that U.S. northern states 
and environmentalists would combine forces with Canada to oppose such plans. Loretta Griffin 
wrote in the Earth Island Journal, that a U.S.-Canada-Mexico group, “The North America 
Water and Power Alliance,” proposed that governments should build a massive water diversion 
project that would supply NAFTA partners will water and electrical power. Griffin summarized 
the plan: 
              This massive system of record-high dams, water diversions, mammoth reservoirs 
and huge aqueducts could make Libya's "Great Man-Made River" water pipeline 
look like a drop in the bucket. Under this little-known, 30-year-old plan, Canadian 
and Alaskan rivers would be diverted to the water-starved American Southwest 
and Mexico. The full NAWAPA plan calls for the creation of 240 dams and 
reservoirs, 112 water diversions and 17 aqueducts and canals capable of moving 
as much as 136 cubic kilometers (85 cubic miles) of water from Alaska to the Rio 
Grande River each year. Some 80 percent of the water would be diverted to the 
US. Of that, 19 percent would be released to flow into Mexico.58 
 
Eight years later, Anthony Wilson-Smith reported in his article for the Maclean’s 
Magazine, “A Fight Reborn,” that water was on the trade agenda. The Government of British 
Columbia passed a bill in the Provincial Legislature banning the bulk export of water to the U.S. 
A California company proceeded to file a complaint to the NAFTA dispute resolution panel 
demanding penalty payments for this government intervention. According to the author, “Alarm 
bells began sounding in Ottawa…and before that challenge, the federal Liberals thought they 
had banned such exports by specifically citing one exception – bottled water.”59 The water issue 
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rekindled the free-trade debate and ignited the bias again and could have been a factor in the 
decline in the number of Canadians that had positive views of the U.S. Today water is not on the 
radar of politicians, media, nor the population. It is dormant for now, but probably not for long. 
There is a uniquely Canadian characteristic that displayed itself in the election of 1891. 
As described earlier, while the free-trade debate raged between MacDonald and Laurier, neither 
politicians nor the public dared mention the French-English divide over language, religion, and 
culture represented by the Manitoba School Question. There was no appetite among Protestants 
for publically funded Catholic schools. Everyone was quiet. In 1896, Laurier defeated 
MacDonald’s Conservatives over the Manitoba school issue and then brokered a solution – 
French where numbers warranted, a policy that brought temporary peace between English and 
French Canada. Over a century later, this issue again reared its head in Ontario elections of 2007 
and 2011, with the controversy focused upon Islamic schooling. 
The provincial Conservatives “snatched defeat from the jaws of victory,” over the issue 
of Muslim religious/education activities. The Conservatives lost support when they spoke in 
favor of public funding for private schools, and when the Conservative leader refused to take a 
stand on Muslim religious ceremonies in public schools. In the election of 2007, the polls 
reported that the Conservatives, a slightly right of center party, led the race by ten points. There 
were no ‘burning issues’ but people wanted change from the Liberals. Several weeks before 
voting, John Tory, the Conservative leader, announced his government would fund faith-based 
private schools. Immediately Conservative support plummeted, and the Liberals won a majority. 
According to Jeoffery Stevens, reporter for the The Guelph Mercury: 
Religion and education have been a combustible combination throughout 
Ontario history. The combustion is reinforced this time by a nasty 
undercurrent of racism – or Islamophobia, as it is being called in the press. 
Pollsters have noted that the level of support for faith-based funding drops 
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precipitously when the word “Muslim” is included in the question. They say 
it is as though the question conjures up visions in some minds of bomb-
building being taught in Ontario schools.60 
 
One year earlier, Canadians learned that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
averted terror attacks potentially three times more devastating than the attacks in Oklahoma 
City. Eighteen Muslim youth, driven by the radical Islam, trained in Canada’s northern 
wilderness to bomb Parliament Hill and other targets. In 2011, the provincial Liberals, who held 
a majority government they gained from the 2007 year fiasco, called an election for October. 
The Laurier Institute of Public Opinion and Policy reported on July 19, 2011 that the recent 
IPSOS poll for Ontario posted on July 14 providing a Conservative lead of 11 percent presents a 
provincial projection of Conservatives 63 seats, Liberal 25 seats, New Democratic Party -19 
seats. Again, the Conservatives could taste victory. Several weeks before the election, the press 
queried all leaders about Islamic prayers in public schools. Mr. Hudak, who in 2007 replaced 
the ill-fated John Tory, failed to provide a definitive response on how his party would address 
the issue. Atoinella Artusa a writer for the Toronto Sun newspaper reported: 
They know the cultures of their schools,” Hudak said. “(I’ll leave) school 
boards and principals to make these types of decisions on what’s appropriate 
... I think that’s the way you approach this.” A decision to allow Islamic 
prayer sessions every Friday in the cafeteria at Valley Park Middle School, 
on Overlea Blvd. in Toronto, continues to draw objections. Local imams 
lead a 40-minute service — non-Muslims are banned from the cafeteria 
during that time — to prevent about 400 students from leaving the school in 
the middle of the day to go to prayers.61  
 
The liberals were even less committal and this angered many voters. However, the leader 
of Ontario’s socialist party was very clear. According to Artusa, the leader of the NPP asserted 
that children should have a quiet place to go to pray if needed, but full religious services do not 
belong in a public school. The Conservatives lost the election, but did gain some seats, while the 
socialist party received the largest increase in seats. 
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A key element behind voter fear was the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. In 
response to this horrific event, most Canadians immediately went silent, leaving a cold 
impression to many Americans. However, the reality was very different. Canadians cared deeply 
and demonstrated these feelings by the overwhelming generosity shown to U.S. citizens who 
were stranded when overseas flights were rerouted to Canada. President Bush publicly 
acknowledged and thanked Canadians for this show of love and respect. Sixteen years later, two 
biases intersected in the Ontario electorate; dislike for private schools (rooted in 1891) and 
cultural fear focused on terrorism (rooted in 2001).  
The press and politicians publicly referred to the first bias (preference for public 
schools), but few politicians and few in the media presented limited or no discussion on this 
second factor, fear of Islam. Some specialists postulated that Canadians do know that racial 
stereotyping is both wrong and it violates the desires of many to be politically correct, and 
therefore the solution is to ‘clam-up.’ The reality is that many Islamic Canadians are abhorrent 
to radicalism and have proven to be excellent citizens, completely contrary to populist fear. The 
Islamic communities work very hard to both become Canadians and provide support to the 
RCMP and intelligence agencies in the war on terrorism. 
Another example of ‘clam up’ occurred in the national federal election of 2006 and 
2011, when Canada was deep into combat action in Afghanistan. The socialist party (New 
Democrats), and the Quebec separatist party, said nothing about Afghanistan while both the 
Liberals and Conservatives chose to debate domestic issues. Katie Hyslop, writer for a regional 
paper on Canada’s west coast wrote, “With the exception of a brief mention of the war in 
Afghanistan by New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton during the English debate, the closest 
any party leader has come to discussing either battle is to squabble over the cost of 65 F-35-
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fighter jets. But critics say the leaders haven't forgotten – they're just hoping the Canadian 
public has.”62 
Voter silence over Afghanistan has its roots in the national psychological trauma from 
the First World War. Canada’s contribution was so costly, it created in Canadians a deep respect 
for our military, and as a result, many citizens refuse to engage in any public disagreement or 
conflict that could damage the honor and sacrifice made by Canada’s soldiers, even if many 
disagree with the cause. Essentially, Canadians are reverent about their patriotism. The Ontario 
elections over education and Afghanistan illustrate this unique ‘clam-up’ characteristic. The 
issue for policymakers is how to know when the population grows silent and what issue 
generates this reaction. Failure to comprehend this characteristic can be catastrophic and affect 
implementation of needed change in society. This is particularly relevant to the Canadian anti-
American bias, where polls indicate moderate views and support while underneath there may be 
a strong different view, such as what happened in the 1988 Canada-U.S. free-trade discussion. 
Conclusion 
 
Are Canadians anti-American? The answer seems obvious enough. Of course we 
are. Historians like me are steeped in the glib patriotisms of the anti free-trade 
campaigns of 1891, 1911 and 1988, or in John Diefenbaker’s “It’s me against the 
Americans” tirades in the 1960s. J. L. Granatstein calls anti-Americanism Canada’s 
state religion. Frank Underhill, a major historian of an earlier generation, 
characterized Canadians as the ideal anti-Americans, the perfect anti-Americans, 
the anti-Americans as they exist in the mind of God. He mused that Americans are 
benevolently ignorant of Canada, while Canadians are malevolently knowledgeable 
about the United States.63  
 
This research moves from defining the source of Canadian attitudes toward the U.S., 
which essentially reflects the founding principles of Canadian democracy (peace, order, and 
good government’ versus the American focus on individuality) through three periods of intense 
dislike over 120 years. The study finds that Canada’s attitude toward the U.S. is not an anti-
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American display but rather a bias that at times becomes nasty, but never permanently damages 
Canada’s relationship with the U.S. Hilmer’s above quote summarizes the high points of 
Canada’s negative expressions toward the U.S., but there have also been low bias periods that 
involved extensive cooperation; after WWI, during WWII, the late 1990s, and cooperation with 
the U.S. on North American security. History reveals that Canadians tend to be more pro-
American during periods of economic prosperity and in times of world crises. 
However, during the 1960s the government halted Canada’s security forces from 
participating in nuclear training exercises and almost prevented the military from assisting the 
U.S. during the Cuban missile crises. Canada’s friendship with Cuba strained the nation’s 
diplomatic and military relationships by creating an environment of distrust with the allies 
during the Cold War. During the 1970s the federal government reduced substantially 
expenditures on the Canadian Forces. In the 1980s Canadian protests over the testing of cruise 
missiles on domestic soil created additional complications in relations with America and the 
Canadian bias slowed (if not halted) Canada’s participation with the U.S. in strategic defense 
initiatives. 
Spending on national security and defense is a precarious issue with the Canadian 
public; today’s support could ‘morph’ into tomorrow’s conflict. Therefore Canada’s 
policymakers must take the pulse of the population so they can take steps to mitigate possible 
risks of ‘blow-back’ on their proposed policies and programs. Analysts could examine segments 
of the Canadian population using focus groups and well-designed attitudinal surveys (market 
research) to identify reactions to issues and emerging trends.  This testing would provide 
policymakers with insights into delicate subjects where Canadians tend to surprise both 
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policymakers and pollsters with reactions hidden under this psychological veil referred to as the 
‘clam-up.’ 
At stake is long-term planning and budgeting the Canadian Forces requires to modernize 
the military to ensure Canada meets its commitments to its allies and have future resources to 
defend the nation. If for example, Canadians have a ‘hidden fear’ over activities in the north, 
this emotion could reveal itself in bias against the Americans, lend support to the more extreme 
environmentalist views, and consequently result in public pressure to reduce needed budgets for 
the defense of Canada’s northern region. The U.S. needs Canada to play its part in the north for 
the security and defense of North American. Currently Canada, and indeed the U.S. may be 
vulnerable to Russian and Chinese activities in the north which Canadians view as their 
territory.   
 Therefore the hypothesis is affirmative. History demonstrates that Canada-U.S. relations 
are influenced by a national cognitive bias against the U.S. that has created difficulties and pose 
future challenges for policymakers who must make choices for the betterment of North 
American national security. The federal election of 1891 does reflect the truism ‘with change 
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